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Privacy as Public Good – A Comparative Assessment  
of the Challenge for CoronApps in Latin America 
 
Kim Barker, Enrique Uribe-Jongbloed, Tobias Scholz 
 
Abstract 
 
Much of the reporting of the tracing apps, tracking programmes, and privacy 
concerns during the developmental processes and the initial stages of the Covid-19 
pandemic have focussed on pitting digital rights and privacy against public health 
interests. Undoubtedly, there is best practice in establishing a tracing app to respond 
to Covid-19 while the work of civil society and NGOs in scrutinising the apps in 
various nations is vitally important and provides the core analysis of the scope of the 
data to be collated and retained. The holding to account of tracing systems and 
governments in utilising technology that is by its very nature invasive is vital in 
protecting digital rights. In times of crisis in particular, accountability is incredibly 
important to ensure that digital rights are not pushed aside in light of other concerns.  
 
To balance digital rights and privacy, and public health, accountability and 
transparency are essential – the scrutiny of the track and trace systems in Germany, 
the UK, and Colombia is therefore undertaken in this paper, which questions from 
interdisciplinary perspectives the scrutiny, accountability, and privacy concerns in 
each nation’s app before offering some conclusions and recommendations for the 
improvement and development of privacy and digital rights in Latin America. The 
conclusions offered here highlight good practice and outline the need for a holistic 
consideration of tracing systems, rather than advocating for a ‘one size fits all 
approach’ by positioning privacy as a public good, rather than an opponent of 
technological tracing systems. 
Keywords: CoronApp, Latin America, Europe, Privacy   
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1. Introduction  
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has not caused new issues1 in respect of dealing with 
personal data, privacy, and technological regulation but has, instead, given a 
renewed prevalence to issues relating to information sharing and the collating of 
data. The conflict between the need for information and privacy – especially in a 
health context – has risen exponentially in 2020 as part of the response to the 
pandemic. Tensions in this area have come to the fore through the unveiling of so-
called ‘corona-apps’ to allow track and trace programmes to operate as part of a 
more holistic public health approach to measuring and controlling outbreaks of 
Covid-19. 
 
With the rise and spread of infection, there has been a parallel rise in track and trace 
apps, all handled slightly differently across different national borders. Within these 
divergent approaches, common challenges arise – notably how to collect data to 
inform the public health response to the pandemic, whilst also ensuring that the apps 
are fit for purpose, widely used, and do not collect data unnecessarily. The unique 
package of the pandemic, together with the clash of rights and regulatory priorities 
provides an opportunity to undertake a comparative analysis of limitations to privacy 
and data protection in Latin America and beyond. This paper therefore undertakes 
such an analysis, and in doing so, fills that knowledge gap.  
 
In this article we present the risks of unaccountable data collection that have arisen 
during the times of Covid-19 in Colombia and Ecuador. We analyze the Colombian 
“CoronApp” issued by the Instituto Nacional de Salud – INS – (Institute of National 
Health) on the 7 of March, 20202 as well as “Salud EC” in Ecuador alongside others 
from Germany, and the UK,3 all of which are aimed at capturing information that 
would help to track and trace the spread of the Covid-19 virus. In comparing the 
successes of the various tracing apps, this paper will explore the utility such apps 
have shown in containing the pandemic4 in spite of the serious concerns about 
privacy violations. In order to analyze the Colombian and – to a lesser extent – 
 
1 In some states, data protection regulations can be set aside in times of crisis, raising concerns about 
the suitability of protections for personal information even in unforeseen situations such as COVID-19. 
See: Morgan Lewis, ‘Coronavirus v. GDPR: Suspending Data Privacy Protection During Civil Crisis – 
The eData Guide to GDPR’ (JD Supra, 10 March 2020) 
<https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/coronavirus-v-gdpr-suspending-data-85584/> accessed 22 July 
2020.  
2 Ministry of Health, ‘CoronApp – Colombia, the application to know the evolution of the coronavirus in 
the country’ (Ministry of Health, 7 March 2020)  
<https://www.minsalud.gov.co/Paginas/CoronApp.aspx> accessed 22 July 2020. 
 
3 Yadira Trujillo, ‘Gobierno de Ecuador presenta la 'app' Salud EC para acceder a una evaluación del 
covid-19 y recibir información’ (El Comercio, 25 March 2020) 
<https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/coronavirus-app-salud-ecuador-telemedicina.html> 
(accessed 22 July 2020).  
 
4 William Hicks, ‘Thai Covid-19 apps judged invasive’ (Bangkok Post, 20 July 2020) 
<https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1954287/thai-covid-19-apps-judged-invasive> accessed 22 
July 2020.  
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Ecuadorian examples in Latin America,5 we start by reviewing the German and UK 
examples, to see how those nations confronted the issue. We then draw from them 
lessons for analyzing the Colombian and Ecuadorian application and forms, and for 
assessing the privacy framework in Latin America in respect of the evolving norm of 
privacy as a public good.  
 
These jurisdictions have been selected because of the differences in responding to 
the Covid-19 pandemic, but also the different regional responses. In selecting 
Germany and the UK, and Colombia and Ecuador as examples, two examples are 
taken from two continental regions (Europe, and Latin America) to enable a 
comparison of responses seen through the perspectives of culture, data protection, 
and media reporting.  The comparisons made in this paper represent a number of 
perspectives, including analysis of organizational national cultures, as presented by 
Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov,6 a legal analysis of the data protection 
developments in the countries, and media perspectives on how this issue has been 
publicly debated. From the first perspective, Latin American cultures (such as 
Colombia and Ecuador) are deemed to present higher power distance (more respect 
and value for authoritarianism and following a strong leader, for instance) and lower 
individualistic values (fostering more consensus and valuing the collective more than 
the individual), in comparison to their European counterparts. That is particularly 
relevant when in legislation on privacy in Latin America,  
 
in formal terms, there is a tendency for the need for the inviolability, 
protection and respect for privacy to be underscored; [yet] on the 
other hand, the cultural dimensions related to the tolerance of 
unequal relations of power and an undervalue of individuality, tend to 
blur the person and their rights. In this sense, there is a legal 
dynamic that tries to keep the sacred value of the person, through 
legal frames that protect privacy and personal data, but in a context 
that disregards it constantly.7  
 
A situation such as the current Covid-19 pandemic presents itself as an interesting 
case in point because it provides a scenario in which to study both the cultural 
aspects behind the actions undertaken by the national or local leaders and the extent 
to which privacy, data protection, regulation, and social constructions of control are 
followed or debated in the public sphere. In particular, through the various Apps 
developed in Colombia and Ecuador to address the Covid-19 threat, it is possible to 
 
5 These are not the only Latin American states where issues surrounding Corona-Apps are 
problematic – a similar app in Chile has also been subjected to scrutiny given the absence of 
adequate data protections. See: International Law Firm Alliance, ‘The legal implications of Contact 
Tracing in Chile’ (Abdala & CIA Abogados, 29 May 2020) <https://diazreus.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/LATAM_contact-tracing.pdf> accessed 22 July 2020.  
6 Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede and Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software of 
the Mind (McGraw-Hill 2010). 
 
7 Nelson Arteaga and Liliana Onofre, ‘La protección a la privacidad en América Latina’ in Karina 
Ansolabehere, Francisco Valdés Ugalde & Daniel Vásquez (eds) Entre el pesimismo y la esperanza: 
Los derechos humanos en América Latina.Metodología para su estudio y medición (FLACSO-México 
2015), 384. Authors own translation 
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see how governments in Latin America have confronted – or not – the topic of 
privacy and data protection in contrast to European situations.  
 
This paper takes an interdisciplinary approach to the comparative exploration of the 
limitations of privacy in Latin America, bringing together insights from business, 
media and communications, and law to offer a holistic analysis. The discussions 
here adopt a comparative focus, through an assessment of the conflict between 
privacy and data sharing, and the collection of data for a significant public health 
response. The discussion then advances to consider the responses to the pandemic 
through the development of CoronApps in Colombia, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, with some, more-limited references to Ecuador.8 
 
The comparative analysis includes discussions of the accountability in operation in 
the rapid development and deployment of apps designed to collect sensitive 
personal information. Finally, the paper draws together the lessons that can be learnt 
from shared experiences albeit in very different national and legal cultures and offers 
recommendations for refining the framework of privacy in Latin America – particularly 
given the ‘newness’ of data protection across the region. The conclusions offered 
here highlight the role of privacy, and its different positioning as a national concern in 
different regions. This paper outlines the need for considerations of tracing systems 
and data protection laws to avoid a ‘one size fits all approach’ by positioning privacy 
as a public good, rather than an opponent of tracing systems.  
 
2. Privacy as a Public Good, Track & Trace Apps, and Covid-19 – A Digital 
Challenge?  
 
The suggestion that privacy may operate as a public good was raised by Fairfield & 
Engel,9 who argue that privacy is not a private good, but rather one that is public. In 
making such an argument, the suggestion is that if an individual is careless with 
data, there is a risk of sharing data not just about oneself, but also about others. In 
order to truly protect privacy therefore, there is a dependency on the others who hold 
data about that individual – no single person can cherish privacy and be truly 
protected alone. In their argument, Fairfield and Engel make it clear that in order to 
hold privacy as a cornerstone of society, everyone must cherish privacy with the 
same intensity. Where this does not happen, there can only ever be ‘suboptimal’ 
levels of privacy achieved. Through the rollout of various track and trace 
programmes, health services and national governments have seen fit to place 
privacy at a suboptimal level, notionally in response to the public health crisis 
presented by Covid-19. This is seen abundantly clearly when leading computer 
scientists state publicly that privacy ought to be sacrificed in the pursuit of other 
public goods.10 Tensions between the public health response to Covid-19, and 
 
8 References to Ecuador are made as a comparator to Colombia, but accessibility of resources has 
limited substantive discussions. 
 
9 Joshua A.T. Fairfield and Christoph Engel, ‘Privacy as a Public Good’ (2015) 65 Duke L.J. 385. 
 
10 Hannah Boland, ‘Sacrifice privacy for public good, says UK’s leading computer scientist’ (The 
Telegraph, 5 April 2020) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2020/04/05/sir-nigel-shadbolt-
emergencies-privacy-might-sacrificed-public/> accessed 06 December 2020.  
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privacy as a public good are almost inevitable competing interests, and yet it is not 
inconceivable that privacy is a public good which can be protected while data is 
collated to contribute to the public good of a national response to Covid-19. 
 
Part of the response – across regions – has been to unveil apps to track and trace 
people who may have been exposed to the virus. These initiatives have – it appears 
– been dealt with differently across nations. This difference is attributed to the 
various political systems, but also the cultural differences in every country. For 
instance, mandatory tracing apps are in use in China, Turkey, and India,11 while in 
other states such as Australia, Germany, and the UK, voluntary systems are being 
utilised. The differences in approach here do not necessarily correlate to distinct 
differences in neither infection nor mortality rates, but instead reflect a difference in 
national response traits. Furthermore, it becomes evident that the specific cultural 
differences have an impact on the pandemic. For example, in terms of cultural 
dimensions, national cultures are described on a spectrum between individualistic 
and collectivistic. Latin American countries are often collectivistic and Northern 
European countries often individualistic.  
 
Moreover, using apps is not a radical step in the smartphone age. The idea of an 
app to follow, track and trace people who were exposed to a virus is not new. 
Latonero presented the case for using apps very clearly in 2018, albeit using Ebola 
as the example that comes into question: 
 
Consider a response organization asking a mobile phone company 
for the phone numbers and records of all the users in the country in 
order to trace the network of individuals who may have become 
infected. That data would need to be analyzed to locate those at risk, 
and personal information might be shared with other responders 
without the consent of the data subjects. 
 
The assumption in such an operational decision is that saving the 
lives of the person’s contacts and protecting the health of the broader 
public outweigh the privacy concerns over that person’s personal 
information. Yet such decisions about trade-offs, particularly in the 
case of the Ebola response, remain highly controversial due to the 
potential privacy violations inherent in collecting the mobile phone 
records of individuals at a national level without the consent of 
individuals.12 
 
The issues Latonero highlighted in 2018 are now central13 to debates about the use 
of the Covid-19 applications developed by governments the world over. The Covid-
 
11 Paul Schwartz, ‘Illusions of consent and COVID-19 tracking apps’ (iapp, 19 May 2020) 
<https://iapp.org/news/a/illusions-of-consent-and-covid-tracking-apps/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
12 Mark Latonero, ‘Big Data Analytics and Human Rights’ in Molly K Land & Jay D Aronson (eds), 
New Technologies for Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 154-155. 
   
13 Mark Latonero, ‘Big Data Analytics and Human Rights’ in Molly K Land & Jay D Aronson (eds), 
New Technologies for Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 154-155.   
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19 aftermath is an excellent working ground for addressing these types of question, 
since many countries have adopted different approaches regarding the control of 
movement, privacy and safety of their citizens. The fact that every country (and even 
states or administrative governments within countries) adopted a different strategy 
on this front seems to provide evidence on how the supposed objective data relating 
to the virus leads to different approaches in handling it, based on cultural, social and 
political structures.14 Equally, the development of different approaches at different 
stages of the pandemic is in itself instructive in examining the emerging traits in 
respect of control versus digital rights.  
 
 
3. The Rights Conflict: Data Protection v Public Safety?  
 
The unprecedented global pandemic, and associated social lockdowns have caused 
not just a public health crisis, but also an associated digital rights crisis. Not only are 
we increasingly dependent on Internet access during such a crisis – for access to 
news, media content, communications, and work, but also for tracking the spread of 
the pandemic. This increased dependency has given greater prominence to access 
to the Internet – which now more than ever needs to be recognised as a fundamental 
human right15 – but has also allowed broader discussions relating to data, privacy, 
trust & transparency, and the hierarchy of rights to emerge into mainstream 
discourse.  
 
As early as 2 April 2020, over 100 civil society organisations called openly on 
governments to respect and uphold human rights in the midst of the pandemic, 
specifically requesting that states do not, “disregard rights such as privacy and 
freedom of expression in the name of tackling a public health crisis”.16  This is a 
particularly powerful and timely reminder of the precarious state of privacy and data 
protection rights in not only the digital age, but one of unprecedented cross-border 
crisis. Such civil society concerns serve as a reminder that in some legal 
jurisdictions, and national territories – such as Germany and the UK – there are 
greater discussions, considerations, and concerns placed upon the sanctity of 
personal data and digital rights than in other states. Regardless of those national 
tendencies – and protections – the Covid-19 crisis has the potential to detrimentally 
 
14 The political influence is not to be understated, especially given the local lockdowns being 
implemented in England with special powers being handed to local councils, without these councils 
having access to track & trace data. This is by definition the localising of lockdowns as a political 
mechanism rather than a legal one.  
 
15 Merten Reglitz, ‘The Human Right to Free Internet Access’ (2020) Journal of Applied Philosophy 
Vol 3(2) 314.  
 
16 Open Rights Group, ‘Joint Civil Society Statement: States use of Digital Surveillance Technologies 
to Fight Pandemic Must Respect Human Rights’ (Open Rights Group, 2 April 2020) 
<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/publications/joint-civil-society-statement-states-use-of-digital-
surveillance-technologies-to-fight-pandemic-must-respect-human-rights/> accessed 22 July 2020. 
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impact upon civil liberties for a prolonged period of time.17 In turn, whilst international 
civil society organisations, and even the United Nations work to establish baseline 
standards for rights protections, it is important to remember that a predominantly 
Westernised approach is not always suited to Latin American states and systems. It 
has been mentioned that the Colombian habeas data law for the protection of 
information capture and management “has implied the tropicalization of European 
norms”18 leading to important normative gaps and leaving decisions to judicial 
interpretation. Thus, it was a Westernised adaptation, rather than a local 
development of Colombian legal system, and a similar thing has taken place 
elsewhere in Latin America. Despite being a transplanted piece of legislation, it fails 
to provide safeguards recommended by the OMS such as the rights to opposition, to 
access and to rectification, exposing the information of citizens under the exceptions 
of sanitary urgency and emergency, even with little to no regard for previous 
sentences of the Constitutional Court.19 The ideal of privacy as a public good,20 
where it serves to protect all, and we should all therefore partake in protecting each 
other’s privacy, is one which is not always the predominant concern in Latin 
American states.  The discourse of protecting all the population is easily manipulated 
so as to dismiss worries about personal and private information as secondary to 
national health and safety. 
 
Not all countries have data protection legislation – notable in respect of the lack of 
approval of the Data Protection Bill in Ecuador21 – as well as through the concerns 
voiced in respect of the Colombian privacy law – which has been considered of 
utmost importance for the protection of the private life of its citizens.22 Calls by 
Human Rights Watch have been overlooked, with the Ecuadorean National 
Assembly continuing to keep the draft bill pending despite the outcry about the data 
 
17 Simon Chandler, ‘Coronavirus Could Infect Privacy and Civil Liberties Forever’ (Forbes, 23 March 
2020) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/2020/03/23/coronavirus-could-infect-privacy-and-
civil-liberties-forever/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
18 Luis Fernando Cote Peña, ‘Hábeas data en Colombia, un trasplante normativo para la protección 
de la dignidad y su correlación con la NTC/ISO/IEC 27001:2013’ (2016) Agencia español de 
protección de datos <https://www.aepd.es/sites/default/files/2019-10/habeas-data-en-Colombia.pdf>.   
 
19 Ana Gómez-Córdoba, Sinay Arévalo-Leal, Diana Bernal-Camargo and Daniela Rosero de los Ríos, 
‘El derecho a la protección de datos personales, tecnologías digitales y pandemia por COVID-19 en 
Colombia’ [The right to personal data protection, digital technologies and the pandemic for COVID-19 
in Colombia] (2020) 50 Rev. Bioética y Derecho 
<http://scielo.isciii.es/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1886-58872020000300017>.  
 
20 Joshua A.T. Fairfield and Christoph Engel, ‘Privacy as a Public Good’ (2015) 65 Duke L.J. 385.  
21 Human Rights Watch, ‘Ecuador: Privacy at Risk with Covid-19 Surveillance’ (Human Rights Watch, 
1 July 2020) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/01/ecuador-privacy-risk-covid-19-surveillance#> 
accessed 22 July 2020; Assemblea Nacional, ‘Gabriela Rivadaneira will promote the data protection 
law’ (12 July 2016) <https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ec/es/noticia/45016-gabriela-rivadeneira-
impulsara-ley-de-proteccion-de> accessed 23 July 2020.  
22 Luis Enriquez Álvarez, ‘Paradigmas de la protección de datos personales en Ecuador. Análisis del 
proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Protección a los Derechos a la Intimidad y Privacidad sobre los Datos 
Personales’ (2017) Foro Revista de Derecho (27) 60. 
Journal of Law, Technology and Trust, Vol 1, Issue 1, 2020
    
8 
 
that the government is collecting without any independent oversight body.23 
Significant concerns remain even after Minister of Telecommunications, Andres 
Michelena, confirmed that the Ecuadorean government had consulted the Court of 
Constitutional Guarantees to check whether respecting privacy could be avoided in 
respect of the data the SaludEC app collects.24 The concerns here persist despite 
the concerns that linger as to the interrelationship between privacy, and the data to 
collect – if data can be pseudonymized – as in the German example – then the 
SaludEC app could enjoy higher uptake, and less criticism.  
 
These contextual issues and the cultural differences highlight the importance of 
cultural-appropriate implementation strategies, especially as it might be necessary to 
counter steer against cultural norms like “being social”, as observable in most Latin 
American countries. Therefore, it is essential to understand the cultural norms in a 
given country and either adapt to them or go against them – a concept that is 
described as competitive acceptance in the literature.25 This is a particularly 
intriguing state of affairs, especially given the prominence of track and trace 
programmes, and the commonality of using technology and big data capture to 
assist in the mapping of, and responses to the pandemic.  
 
Given that the use of apps to track and trace is not confined to a handful of 
countries, or to selected regions, there is a unique opportunity to examine the 
responses to the development of these apps, as well as the responses to the 
concerns raised in respect of the invasiveness of tracing technology. Issues persist 
though, and increasingly, the use of apps, the collection of data, and the impinging 
on digital rights and digital freedoms are increasingly being pitched as barriers to 
tackling the pandemic. This is in part, rhetoric, but also positions digital rights such 
as privacy as opposed to other priorities such as public health. Moreover, the two are 
not – and should not be pitched as – mutually exclusive. In the era of big data, and 
technology, it should be possible to deploy apps to track and trace whilst ensuring 
that privacy rights are upheld, and accountability is maintained. Physical liberties 
have already been put in a fragile state through various lockdowns – digital liberties 
should offer a sense of emergence and should form part of the solution. The use of 
apps is a cornerstone of the Covid-19 response, but, as de Montjoye states, there is 
a need for a balance: “Contact tracing requires handling very sensitive data at scale, 
 
23 Human Rights Watch, ‘Ecuador: Privacy at Risk with Covid-19 Surveillance’ (Human Rights Watch, 
1 July 2020) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/01/ecuador-privacy-risk-covid-19-surveillance#> 
accessed 22 July 2020. 
 
24 Gonzalo Salano, ‘Ecuador uses technology to fight COVID-19’ (AP, 16 April 2020) 
<https://apnews.com/516d5ddc49e3436c8681356a640c6a46> accessed 22 July 2020.  
25 Christian Scholz and Volker Stein, Interkulturelle Wettbewerbsstrategien (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 
2013). 
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and solid and proven techniques exist to help us do it while protecting our 
fundamental right to privacy. We cannot afford to not use them.”26 
 
 
4. Confronting the Covid-19 Pandemic with Technology: The Rise of the 
Coronapps 
 
The discussion that follows here considers app development – and concerns – in 
each of the nations of Colombia, Germany, and the UK. The rollout of the various 
apps highlights the different developmental stages and concerns in the different 
countries, but also reflects the management of the pandemic in each of these legal 
jurisdictions. We turn first to Colombia, and its CoronApp. 
 
4.1. The Colombian CoronApp 
 
It is interesting to note that the Colombian “CoronApp” predates the development 
and release of the German and UK apps (both of which were developed as lockdown 
restrictions begun to be lifted), having been released on the 7th of March, 2020,27 
although it was built on top of a 2017 App designed as an information system and 
monitoring tool for massive gatherings in the wake of Pope Francis I’s visit to the 
country.28 By 9 March 2020 – within two days of its release – Privacy International 
was already voicing concern about potential flaws with the App, based on a concept 
developed by the Karisma Foundation.29 Despite the shortcomings, the Colombian 
government went full-throttle in promoting the App, offering 1 GB of free data and 
100 air minutes for those who download the App and registered through it.30 
Moreover, the Colombian government entered an agreement with Samsung, one of 
the best-selling mobile phone companies in the country, through which the 
CoronApp installed itself once the user had downloaded and installed the latest 
 
26 Caroline Brogan, ‘COVID-19 contact tracing apps: 8 privacy questions governments should ask’ 
(Imperial College News, 2 April 2020) <https://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/196656/covid19-contact-
tracing-apps-privacy-questions/> accessed 23 July 2020.  
27 Ministry of Health, ‘CoronApp – Colombia, the application to know the evolution of the coronavirus 
in the country’ (Ministry of Health, 7 March 2020)  
<https://www.minsalud.gov.co/Paginas/CoronApp.aspx> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
28 Semana, ‘"La utilidad de CoronApp está en duda": coalición de derechos digitales’ (Semana, 22 
May 2020) 
 <https://www.semana.com/tecnologia/articulo/informe-de-coalicion-de-derechos-digitales-no-ve-
utilidad-de-coronapp/673581> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
29 Privacy International, ‘Colombia: Coronapp fails at public information purpose’ (Privacy 
International, 9 March 2020) <https://privacyinternational.org/examples/3435/colombia-coronapp-fails-
public-information-purpose> accessed 22 July 2020. 
 
30 El Ministerio de Technologias, ‘Con descarga de CoronApp Colombia, usuarios de telefonía móvil 
prepago obtendrán internet y minutos de voz gratis durante un mes’ (Presidencia, 24 April 2020) 
<https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Paginas/prensa/2020/descarga-CoronApp-Colombia-usuarios-telefonia-
movil-prepago-obtendran-internet-minutos-voz-gratis-durante-un-mes-200424.aspx> accessed 22 
July 2020.  
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system security update in their Samsung phone without informed consent.31 The 
government also asserted – in efforts to build trust – that the App was created by the 
Agencia Nacional Digital - AND (National Digital Agency) – a public/private entity 
(rather than the government) whose task is to “dynamize the construction of a more 
efficient, transparent and participative State”.32 However, in the information on the 
App itself, under the “Acerca de CoronApp” (About CoronApp) section, there is no 
mention of the AND, and on the Google Play Store it appears as created by the INS. 
The information provided about the App on the AND webpage33 differs from the 
information you find in the App, bringing into question the transparency of the effort.  
 
The Karisma Foundation, an NGO dedicated to studying cases of privacy-breach in 
Colombia, has done a series of reports on the App. Lately it dismissed the App 
altogether, saying it does not work and it will not work, because of the lack of 
transparency regarding the handling of the data, the apparent trial-run done by the 
AND on the tracing feature, and the fact that it is using a centralized rather than a 
decentralized database.34 In the congressional debate held on the 16th of June, 
senator Juanita Goebertus received contradictory replies from different levels of 
government and the INS regarding the data that will be stored, how, and for how 
long. She finally stated that the lack of a clear policy regarding the handling of the 
information could be responsible for the very limited usage of the App, spreading to 
less than 12% of the population.35 The concerns raised here, are similar to those 
raised by the AND eventually, when it came out in criticism of the App, suggesting 
that the cultural mistrust of the government when it comes to data, is more 
widespread than is reported. In essence, this tension does not play out through 
privacy as a public good, but rather because of the cultural tendencies to comply 
with authoritarian regimes. Trends have emerged – through NGOs such as AND, as 
well as through senatorial questions, as to the situation with data and privacy. While 
slow to emerge, these represent widespread elements of mistrust in the natural traits 
in Colombia.  
 
In order to explore further the risk to privacy, the conflict of rights, and approaches to 
data protection, we look at the approaches taken elsewhere to compare it with the 
Colombian CoronApp. The approach adopted in Germany is considered first.  
 
  
 
31 Las2orillas, ‘La jugadita de Samsung y el gobierno con la aplicación CoronApp‘ (Las Orillas, 23 
May 2020) <https://www.las2orillas.co/la-jugadita-de-samsung-y-el-gobierno-con-la-aplicacion-
coronapp/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
32 Agencia Nacional Digital <https://and.gov.co/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
33 Agencia Nacional Digital, ‘LA HISTORIA DETRÁS DE CORONAPP’ (Agencia Nacional Digital, 4 
May 2020) <https://and.gov.co/news/la-historia-detras-de-coronapp/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
34 Carolina Botero, ‘CoronApp neither works nor will work’ (Fundación Karisma, 28 June 2020)  
<https://web.karisma.org.co/coronapp-ni-funciona-ni-funcionara/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
35 AlianzaVerde, ‘Debate a CoronApp sin respuestas": Representante Juanita Goebertus.‘ (Alianza 
Verde, 16 June 2020) <https://www.alianzaverde.org.co/liderando-congreso/debate-a-coronapp-sin-
respuestas-representante-juanita-goebertus> accessed 22 July 2020.  
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4.2. Corona-Warn-App in Germany  
 
In Germany, the so-called "Corona-Warn-App" was released on the 16th of June 
2020 and was published by the Robert Koch-Institut. The app was developed by 
SAP and the Deutsche Telekom. From a technological perspective, the app utilized 
the interface protocol designed by Apple and Google. With nearly 16 million 
downloads on the 13th of July, the app can be considered a success because of its 
uptake numbers in such a short space of time.36 Although the open-source and 
decentralized approach is highly praised,37 the German government preferred a 
centralized and more intrusive procedure. It is therefore evident that the 
technological change was based on the public discourse through NGOs and 
developers that forced the government to rethink their approach. 
 
In Germany, data privacy is a valued good, and there is still a vivid community that 
fights for net neutrality.38 The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) is the most prominent 
organization that fights for privacy and data protection. Consequently, they issued an 
open letter concerning the proposed centralized approach for the Corona App.39 In 
that letter, they predicted the failure of an App, which is optional to use, that cannot 
create any trust in the user. Furthermore, they highlight that there is a risk of misuse. 
In short, movement data is sensitive and requires protection, but data about the 
potential infection may be even more harmful. The CCC states that complete 
surveillance of movement data and the access to health data may be a horror-
scenario. If it were possible to de-anonymize, the gläserne Bürger (glass citizen) 
would be possible.  
 
As a result, it becomes apparent that the proposed approach by the government 
would lead to dangers for society, especially as the app mimics a black box. 
Interestingly the main stakeholders in the smartphone market, Apple and Google, 
also prefer a decentralized approach.40 This strategy is surprising, as both 
companies can be seen as Datenkrake (data hydras), and have data-driven 
commercial business models.  IT-experts from CCC and many other NGOs, as well 
as Apple and Google, focused on a decentralized approach. Given that it is deemed 
 
36 Robert Koch Institut, ‘Disrupt infection chains digitally with the Corona warning app’ (Robert Koch 
Institut, 17 July 2020) 
<https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavirus/WarnApp/Warn_App.html> 
accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
37 Dominik Rpzeka, ‘”Run exemplary” Chaos Computer Club praises German Corona app’ (zdfheute, 
16 June 2020) < https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/corona-app-launch-100.html> accessed 22 
July 2020).  
 
38 Tobias M Scholz, ‚Die Konvergenz der Digitalisierung – eine Prognose für Europa‘ in: Christian 
Scholz, Peter Dörenbächer, and Anne Rennig (eds.) Europa jenseits des Konvergenzparadigmas 
Divergenz – Dynamik – Diskurs, Nomos (Baden-Baden) 2019, 357-375. 
 
39 Chaos Computer Club, ‘Corona tracing app: Open letter to the Federal Chancellery and Minister of 
Health’ (Chaos Computer Club, 24 April 2020) < https://www.ccc.de/de/updates/2020/corona-tracing-
app-offener-brief-an-bundeskanzleramt-und-gesundheitsminister> accessed 22 July 2020.  
40 Apple, ‘Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing‘<https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing> 
accessed 22 July 2020.  
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essential, the app needs to be widely used in the general population to be effective, 
and if it is spread in popularity efficiently, it becomes a dangerous tool ripe for 
misuse. People need to trust the app utilization as well as the people behind the app. 
Therefore, CCC described contact tracing as a high-risk technology and produced 
ten criteria on which contact tracing apps need to be evaluated:41 
 
1. Epistemological use & appropriation to the purpose: It is essential to 
prove that any contact tracing app will help to fight against Covid-19 
and that any data is solely used for this fight 
2. Voluntary and non-discriminatory: Any app that needs to used freely 
and people who are not using the app should not fear any 
disadvantages by that. 
3. Fundamental privacy: Anonymization and cryptography are the core 
of any app and need to ensure the safety and privacy of the users. 
There need to be the highest standards for privacy, and they need 
to be enforced by the legal entities 
4. Transparency and verifiability: The whole source code needs to be 
open-source, and it should be possible to test and verify the app 
individually and freely 
5. No central entity that we must trust: A central server is not a must-
requirement for contact tracing from a technological point of view. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to build upon the central approach 
6. Datensparsamkeit (data minimization): It is essential to collect only 
the data that is necessary for contact tracing. Even if data is 
gathered for epidemiological research, the user needs to accept this 
utilization. 
7. Anonymity: Any data collected by the app needs to be anonymized, 
and, most fundamentally, nobody can de-anonymize the data. 
8. No installation of central movement and contact profiles: The app 
needs to be programmed that is impossible to create profiles of 
movement and contacts even if it may be unintended. Logging 
through GPS, phone number, or social media should be refused. 
9. Unchainable: It is essential that any ID needs to be protected, and 
the underlying chain of contact is never derivable from other data. 
Only with the right key, the contact chain can be revealed 
10. Unobservability of communication: Even if communication in the 
system is observable, it is crucial that nobody can find out that a 
person may be infected or was in contact with an infected person.  
 
It is still unclear if the social influence or the power of Apple and Google led to the 
change in strategy. However, due to the approach of open source code and a 
relative data minimizing approach, it seems that the government listened to CCC and 
other NGOs. Even though the CCC is still suspicious of the government, they are no 
 
41 Chaos Computer Club, ’10 touchstones for the assessment of “Contact Tracing” apps’ (Chaos 
Computer Club, 6 April 2020) < https://www.ccc.de/de/updates/2020/contact-tracing-requirements> 
accessed 22 July 2020.  
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longer criticizing the app.42 It is somewhat surprising for everybody that a 
government-initiated app may follow the criteria mentioned above but such surprise 
led to CCC-spokesperson, Linus Neumann, stating that CCC found no noteworthy 
shortcomings and added that this situation is confusing for him as well!43 The – if not 
quite praise – then wide acclaim for the approach of the app from the CCC focused 
around the decentralized and pseudonymized data storage, and general all-round 
privacy friendly development. While there is little evidence as to why the Government 
followed the CCC recommendations, it is reasonable to conclude that the influence 
of the CCC – and its support – would be critical in ensuring widespread downloading 
of the app as a cornerstone of the Covid-19 response in Germany.  
 
The NGO Netzpolitik.org also discussed the app and highlighted that its 
development was promising.44 It seems that societal debate led to significant 
changes, and ultimately, a lot was "done right." The code is open source, while the 
community has a chance to discuss obstacles in the code and propose changes. 
The decentralized approach helps issues with anonymity and usage given the 
scepticism of society. The app was designed to minimize data collection and yet a 
study by YouGov at the release date shows that the country may be split into two 
camps, with only half the population intending to use the app.45 Moreover, the app 
may not work with some smartphones, leading to technological discrimination as well 
as the digital divide concerning age and economic status.46  
 
Even though the app seemed quite successful after nearly a month's usage, it still 
needs more users. The Corona-Warn-App can be seen as a successful tool based 
on its technical merits. The app is decentralized and open source; it focuses on 
many criteria the CCC derived. And still, there is a high degree of scepticism. 
Furthermore, the path to digitized society is not yet finished. People are not all 
connected to a smartphone, and not every smartphone is capable of using this app. 
There is an underlying bias within any contact tracing app, that even one of the 
seemingly best apps currently existing, cannot overcome.  
 
The Corona-Warn-App has seen some – albeit limited – success, and sets out a 
benchmark for other European schemes to aspire to, and has arguably influenced 
 
42 Susanne Höb, ‘Corona app: Chaos Computer Club makes no recommendation’ (Berliner 
Morgenpost, 30 June 2020) <https://www.morgenpost.de/politik/article229394400/Corona-App-Daten-
Sicherheit-Chaos-Computer-Club-Kritik.html> accessed 22 July 2020.  
43 T3N, ‘The government is trolling the CCC with this “nasty trick”’ (T3N, 22 June 2020) 
<https://t3n.de/news/corona-warn-app-ccc-1293138/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
44 Markus Beckedahl, ‘Much has been done correctly’ (Netzpolitik.org, 15 June 2020)   
<https://netzpolitik.org/2020/vieles-doch-noch-richtig-gemacht/> accessed 22 July 2020. 
  
45 YouGov, ‘Pressegrafiken: Corona-Warn-App 17-19 June 2020’ (YouGov, 22 June 2020) 
<http://www.yougov.de/pressecharts_Corona_Warn_App> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
46 Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, ‘A quarter say they use the Corona warning app’ (BfR, 26 
June 2020) 
<https://www.bfr.bund.de/de/presseinformation/2020/23/ein_viertel_gibt_an__die_corona_warn_app_
zu_nutzen-248780.html> accessed 22 July 2020.  
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other nations in making their own apps open-source.47 Going open-source and 
having an open discussion about the development helped the app to gain trust and 
achieve some form of transparency. There is no backdoor or other malware in the 
app, so, even if there is mistrust in the developing companies or the government, if 
NGOs like the CCC are supporting the app, this creates widespread trust. The NHSX 
app in the UK has adopted a different approach, and it is to an examination of that 
track & trace scheme that we turn to next.  
 
 
4.3. NHSX Track & Trace in the UK  
 
The management of Covid-19 through so-called ‘track and trace’ systems across the 
different territories within the UK has caused little short of national ridicule, but 
beyond that, evidences the dangers of untested and untried pieces of technology 
that rely on population trust. The farce that the NHSX Track & Trace programme 
descended into begets the divergence of approaches that have played out across 
England & Wales; Scotland, and Northern Ireland – who have all developed alternate 
app systems as part of the devolved management of the Covid-19 pandemic.48 The 
‘joined up’ approach has fallen flat, with Scotland, and Northern Ireland preferring 
apps that meet their specific requirements within each respective legal territory, 
rather than being thrown together as part of the UK-wide approach mandated by 
Westminster. Concerns have dogged the NHSX track & trace app since its ill-
conceived introduction. The UK Government first piloted its contact-tracing app – a 
dedicated app developed by the National Health Service (NHS) in its Covid-19 app – 
in May 2020 and launched it on the Isle of Wight as a trial on 28 May 2020. The 
NHSX Covid-19 app was hailed as the forefront of the UK Government battle against 
Covid-19 despite not following the architecture of the Google and Apple app.  
 
In the UK, the approach adopted by Her Majesty’s Government has been one of 
fiasco,49 misstep, and blasé assumptions about the willingness of the populace to 
follow the Government requests to download and share – openly – data with the 
Government itself. The short-lived NHSX Covid-19 app was swiftly abandoned on 18 
June,50 despite Prime Minister Johnson’s assertions in late May that there would be 
 
47 Andrea Downey, ‘Code for Ireland’s Covid Tracker app given to global public health project’ (Digital 
Health Net, 23 July 2020) <https://www.digitalhealth.net/2020/07/code-for-irelands-covid-tracker-app-
given-to-global-public-health-project/> accessed 23 July 2020.  
48 Angela Daly and Maurice Mulvenna, ‘UK contact tracing apps: the view from Northern Ireland and 
Scotland’ Ada Lovelace Institute (24 September 2020) <https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/uk-
contact-tracing-apps-the-view-from-northern-ireland-and-scotland/> accessed 06 December 2020; 
Matt Reynolds, ‘The UKs contact tracing plan has two fatal flaws’ (WIRED News, 22 May 2020) 
<https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-coronavirus-contact-tracing-testing-flaws> accessed 06 December 
2020.  
 
49 Oliver Wright and Tom Knowles, ‘Coronavirus app failure leaves tracing plan in disarray’ (The 
Times, 19 June 2020) < https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/huge-u-turn-as-virus-tracking-app-is-
axed-rf3nh66kq> accessed 22 July 2020.  
50 Laura Donnelly and Mike Wright, ‘NHS coronavirus contract-tracing app ditched in major U-turn’ 
(The Telegraph, 18 June 2020) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/06/18/nhs-coronavirus-
contact-tracing-app-ditched-major-u-turn/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
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a ‘world-beating’51 system in operation in Britain to lead the way in lifting lockdown 
restrictions. The abandonment of the home-grown app was not just one brought 
about by the lack of trust in the Government, but also in the app itself. The move to 
the Apple / Google variant of the app was made for – at least notionally – technical 
tracing reasons once it became apparent that the NHSX Covid-19 app was not fit for 
purpose and was only detecting 1 in 25 contacts on Apple iPhones.52 In reality, there 
are a number of significant hurdles that the NHSX Covid-19 app had to overcome – 
and in which it was found to be lacking.  
 
Significantly – and perhaps most prominently – when the app trial was rolled out 
across the Isle of Wight with a population of 140 000, between 50 000 and 60 000 
people downloaded it.53 A confirmed figure of downloads is tricky to pinpoint, 
especially given concerns that the number of downloads may actually be lower, as 
some people may have downloaded the app more than once, or it may have been 
downloaded by those not actually on the Isle of Wight.54 These flaws – whilst 
significant given the reliance on data collection, and indeed, data sharing – raise 
serious questions about the security and integrity of the app itself. More pressing 
concerns about the data sharing expected – and the security of that personal data – 
were raised before the trial was concluded. The most serious issues relate to the 
information that the app collates – which, given its operation based on Bluetooth, 
and requires on Android phones location services to be enabled, are significant, and 
despite scrutiny taking place in the Houses of Parliament, the app trial was described 
as ‘enormously successful’ with ‘huge’55 take-up rates – a matter of some debate 
given the issues with the figures, and the subsequent abandonment of app and trial. 
Volpicelli argues that the real reason for the trial of the NHS Covid-19 app was to get 
the public used to the idea of being traceable and being tracked, rather than for the 
app to have a significant impact upon the infection rates.56 This is in part, 
 
51 Reuters, ‘UK PM Johnson vows “world beating” track and trace COVID system by June 1’ (Reuters, 
20 May 2020) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-track-
idUSKBN22W1MW> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
52 Laura Donnelly and Mike Wright, ‘NHS coronavirus contract-tracing app ditched in major U-turn’ 
(The Telegraph, 18 June 2020) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/06/18/nhs-coronavirus-
contact-tracing-app-ditched-major-u-turn/> accessed 22 July 2020. 
 
53 There are discrepancies in reporting, with some reports suggesting the figures reached 60 000+ 
according to Gian Volpicelli, ‘What’s really happening with the NHS Covid-19 app trial’ (Wired, 16 
June 2020) <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/contact-tracing-app-isle-of-wight-trial> accessed 22 July 
2020, whereas other reports more conservatively put the number at 50 000 (Matt Burgess, 
‘Everything you need to know about the NHS test, track and trace app’ (Wired, 18 June 2020) 
<https://www.wired.co.uk/article/nhs-covid-19-tracking-app-contact-tracing> accessed 22 July 2020). 
  
54 Tom Morgan, ‘Isle of Wight contact tracing trial undermined by people on UK mainland downloading 
the app’ (The Telegraph, 23 May 2020) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/isle-wight-contact-
tracing-trial-undermined-people-uk-mainland/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
55 HL Deb 19 May 2020, vol 803, col 1089.  
 
56 Gian Volpicelli, ‘What’s really happening with the NHS Covid-19 app trial’ (Wired, 16 June 2020) 
<https://www.wired.co.uk/article/contact-tracing-app-isle-of-wight-trial> accessed 22 July 2020.  
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understandable because of the notion that one must download an app and carry 
one’s phone everywhere – which could in part be more intrusive than anticipated.  
 
At the behest of the Government, a ‘voluntary’ app was being rolled out that actively 
tracks locations and identifies who else you have been in proximity to. What is 
particularly interesting is that not only did the NHSX Covid-19 app get abandoned on 
– notionally – grounds of technical limitations, but the shift to endorse and use 
smartphone functionality from the ‘app’ experts of Apple & Google,57 indicates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the values of the public. For instance, the Isle of 
Wight trial highlighted – at best – a less than 50% take-up rate of a Government 
backed and developed app. That was, perhaps not the smartest move designed to 
build trust, especially given that Google – producer of Android software – and Apple 
– producer of iPhones and the iOS software are two of the largest technology 
producers, and two of the three entities with the largest presence in the smartphone 
market in the UK. To put it differently, the public already trust Apple and Google with 
their personal data – some of it much more intrusive, such as the Health apps on 
iPhones – much more than the NHSX Covid-19 app.  
 
The intrusiveness of the app, and of the need to carry a phone everywhere remains 
a problem of the ‘always on’ generation, and digital dependency, despite the 
increasing push for privacy as a public good to be a working norm in Europe. It also 
rests on the presumption that everyone has – and can afford – a compatible 
smartphone, which is a sweeping assumption about technological affordability,58 and 
the digital divide at times of unprecedented financial and economic hardship.59  The 
use of the Google / Apple ecosystem in part addresses the intrusiveness concerns, 
not least because of the public willingness to trust these two commercial actors with 
their data – much more readily, even pre-pandemic. Yet because trust, and 
transparency was not apparent in the Government app, public willingness was not as 
abundant in using a Government app. Ultimately on 18 June, the UK Government 
switched to the decentralised Apple-Google model for its virus tracing software.60 
This is unsurprising given the concerns that privacy campaigners and groups have 
expressed in light of the track and trace apps.  
 
 
57 Zoe Kleinman, ‘Coronavirus: New Covid-19 tracing tool appears on smartphones’ (BBC News, 20 
June 2020) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53120290> accessed 22 July 2020.  
58 Sonia Jorge, ‘2019 Affordability Report’ (Alliance for Affordable Internet, 2019) 
<https://a4ai.org/affordability-report/report/2019/> accessed 23 July 2020.  
59 Mercedes Garcia-Escribano, ‘Low Internet Access Driving Inequality’ (International Monetary Fund, 
29 June 2020) < https://blogs.imf.org/2020/06/29/low-internet-access-driving-inequality/> accessed 23 
July 2020; Pedro Nicolai da Costa, ‘Digital Divide Becomes ‘Chasm’ as Covid-19 Drags On’ (Forbes, 
30 June 2020) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/pedrodacosta/2020/06/30/digital-divide-becomes-
chasm-as-covid-19-pandemic-drags-on/#66ce82947fba> accessed 22 July 2020.  
60 Leo Kallon, ‘UK virus-tracing app switches to Apple-Google model’ (BBC News, 18 June 2020) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53095336> accessed 22 July 2020; Mariano Delli Santi, 
‘NHSX App Delayed, but Data Protection Still MIA’ (ORG Blog, 23 June 2020) 
<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/nhsx-app-has-been-delayed-but-data-protection-is-as-urgent-
as-ever/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
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Concerns have been raised throughout the pandemic about the UK app by the 
leading privacy and digital rights advocacy group in the UK, the Open Rights Group 
(ORG). In April 2020, ORG highlighted that there was a need to explain:  
 
1. What safeguards and scrutiny will be provided to safely allow for the 
“tracking” of individuals. 
2. What other data, combined with traffic or location data, may be 
necessary to effectively combat the spread of coronavirus. 
3. What conversations it has had with other governments on cross-
border data initiatives to prevent the spread of coronavirus. 
4. How the Government are engaging with PEPP-TP. 
5. The Government’s criteria for assessing the different 
technology approaches to contact tracing apps. 
6. If the Government is to adopt technology solutions for monitoring 
the spread of the virus after lifting the lock-down, and whether it will 
commit to the strongest strong privacy-preserving model to combat 
the spread of the virus.61 
 
The concerns of ORG were significant enough that the NHS Test and Trace scheme 
in the UK was threatened with court action unless the Government undertook an 
assessment of data protection implications.62 Such a step was taken by ORG in light 
of the fact that there was seemingly no data protection impact assessment (DPIA)63 
conducted, but also because the privacy notice in the Test and Trace scheme fails to 
differentiate between personal data, and special category data.64 Similarly, the notice 
relies upon the Americanisation of ‘personally identifiable data’65 instead – not 
something enshrined in law in the UK. Perhaps the most significant concern 
alongside these is that the app itself suggested that data would be retained for a 
period of 20 years.66 Such a position indicates that the Government is ignoring legal 
 
61 Open Rights Group, ‘Covid-19 and Personal Data: April Briefing’ (ORG, 7 April 2020) 
<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/publications/covid-19-and-personal-data-april-briefing/> accessed 
22 July 2020.  
 
62 Open Rights Group, ‘Government Admits Test and Trace Unlawful’ (Open Rights Group, 20 July 
2020) <https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press-releases/government-admits-test-and-trace-unlawful/> 
accessed 22 July 2020; Laurie Clarke, ‘Digital rights group report NHS Test and Trace to ICO, claims 
legal breach’ (New Statesman, 4 June 2020) <https://tech.newstatesman.com/gdpr/open-rights-
group-reports-nhs-test-and-trace-to-ico> accessed 22 July 2020.  
63 Required under s64 Data Protection Act 2018 which states that wherever there is a type of data 
processing “which is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals” a data 
protection impact assessment is required.   
 
64 Which includes data revealing racial or ethnic origins; political opinions; religious or philosophical 
beliefs; trade union membership; genetic data; biometric data; health; sex life; sexual orientation. See 
Data Protection Act 2018, Schedule 1.  
 
65 As listed in the Data Protection Act 2018, Schedule 1.   
 
66 NHS Test and Trace Privacy Information: <https://contact-tracing.phe.gov.uk/help/privacy-notice> 
accessed 22 July 2020.   
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obligations in respect of data protection, but also eschewing calls for protections67 to 
be embedded in new privacy legislation too. The latter suggestion was resoundingly 
shouted down by the Secretary of State for Health, and brushed aside as though 
minor – a point noted with disappointment by the Human Rights Committee on 7 
May 202068 despite suggestions being made in respect of this requirement.69 
Ultimately, the Secretary of State for Health had to admit the lack of DPIA and the 
consequent unlawfulness of the Covid-19 tracing programme in July 2020,70 
reflecting the importance of the work of the ORG in protecting privacy rights. 
 
All of these concerns are significant, highlighting the very real risks that the so-called 
anonymity71 of the programme to test and trace is at best a minor inconvenience and 
was never at the heart of the plan – perhaps initially for understandable reasons. The 
dangers though – despite the political wrangling and high-level complaints lodged 
with the Government – are much more ‘real’ on the ground. Notably, in light of the 
lack of thought given to privacy and safety, reports are emerging of abuses of the 
system by those required to play a role within it. For instance, reports are emerging 
of people being contacted through social media platforms by staff from pubs and 
restaurants. These reports allege that people are being contacted – for amongst 
other things, dating – based on their details being left at pubs or restaurants as part 
of the track and trace programmes.72 Not only does this cast doubt upon who can act 
as a contact tracer, but also highlights the vulnerabilities of the system which is 
predicated on trust at all levels, and which is open to abuse. It also prejudices the 
potential uptake of a track & trace app, if it is open to abuse by complying with 
government regulations implemented to contain the pandemic – such as leaving 
contact details with commercial venues.  
 
67 Laurie Clarke, ‘Government says no to new privacy legislation for NHSX contact tracing app’ (New 
Statesman, 22 May 2020) <https://tech.newstatesman.com/gdpr/government-privacy-legislation-nhsx-
app> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
68 Harriet Harman (22 May 2020) 
<https://twitter.com/HarrietHarman/status/1263755692655157249?s=20> accessed 22 July 2020; 
Matt Hancock, ‘COVID-19 Safeguards Bill Letter’ (21 May 2020) 
<https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/1223/documents/10345/default/> accessed 22 July 
2020.  
69 Lilian Edwards and others, ‘The Coronavirus (safeguards) Bill 2020: Proposed Protections for 
Digital Interventions and in Relation to Immunity Certificates’ (13 April 2020) 
<osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/yc6xu> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
70 RT.Com, ‘”Reckless”: Privacy rights group lashes out at UK govt after it admits Covid-19 Test and 
Trace program didn’t follow legal rules’ (RT.com, 20 July 2020) <https://www.rt.com/uk/495261-
privacy-covid19-test-trace-unlawful/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
71 Laurie Clarke, ‘NHS test and trace privacy doc throws doubt on app’s “anonymity” claims’ (New 
Statesman, 28 May 2020) <https://tech.newstatesman.com/coronavirus/nhs-test-and-trace-privacy-
doc-throws-doubt-on-apps-anonymity-claims> accessed 22 July 2020.  
 
72 Tali Fraser, ‘Has the abuse of ‘test and trace’ started already?’ (The Spectator, 12 July 2020) 
<https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/has-the-abuse-of-test-and-trace-started-already-> accessed 06 
December 2020. Other similar reports of ‘abuses’ of the tracing programmes have also arisen: FR24 
News, ‘Woman says bartender used coronavirus tracking information to send Facebook message’ (11 
July 2020) <https://www.fr24news.com/a/2020/07/woman-says-bartender-used-coronavirus-tracking-
information-to-send-facebook-message.html> accessed 06 December 2020.  
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In light of all of these deficiencies with the UK system, Her Majesty’s Government 
are keen to adopt incentives in a revamped NHS tracing app to try and “win over a 
sceptical public and revitalise the troubled project”.73 The proposed changes suggest 
that personal benefits such as those triggering notifications through wearable 
technology will be introduced. These suggestions – whilst potentially beneficial – are 
likely to ensure yet more privacy concerns emerge – not least from Apple, who have 
raised questions about the precise location function proposed to be used in 
developing these changes.74 Not only this, but the very notion that the Government 
can tap into ‘Fitbit’ style solutions at the very time the European Commission is 
determining whether Google and Fitbit be allowed to merge75 suggests a further 
misreading of the public mood relating to data sharing, whilst raising further issues 
about the sensitivity of the information collected.76 
 
What all of these examples – from Colombia, Germany, and the UK indicate, is that 
there is a shared approach to the implementation of a tracing app. In the enduring 
Covid-19 public health crisis, despite differences of approach to privacy, many 
countries including Colombia, Germany, and the UK are all turning to technology to 
gather data and inform the response. What is also an emerging trend, is the absence 
of shared practice and expertise in developing an app which values tracing to tackle 
the pandemic whilst also prioritising data protection – the two should not be mutually 
exclusive and yet this is how they are positioned by the states requiring their 
development. Intriguingly, the divergent approaches offer some scope for Latin 
America to enhance their apps and develop their data protection provisions 
simultaneously – it is to this that the discussion now turns.  
 
5. Reflections from Europe – Recommendations for Latin America 
 
Based on this analysis, it becomes evident, that even though the virus is borderless 
and has no “culture”, cultural differences have a hefty influence on the design of a 
Corona App as well as the implementation strategy of such an App. Any tracing app 
requires a certain amount of diffusion in the public to even work properly, 
consequently there is a digital version of herd immunity, when it comes to tracking 
the virus. There are many approaches for how to deal with the cultural differences 
across the respective countries. The differences between Germany and UK reveal 
that there are diametral paths to tackle that. Understanding the reasons for the 
differences are helpful to deal with the own implementation strategies. Germany has 
 
73 Rowland Manthorpe, ‘Coronavirus: New NHS England contact-tracing app may bring ‘personal 
benefits’ (Sky News, 22 July 2020) < https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-new-nhs-england-
contact-tracing-app-will-use-fitbit-style-contact-counts-12033994> accessed 23 July 2020.  
74 Op. cit. 
 
75 Foo Yun Chee, ‘Google offers data pledge in bid to win EU okay for Fitbit buy’ (Reuters, 13 July 
2020) <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-fitbit-m-a-alphabet-eu-exclusive/exclusive-google-offers-data-
pledge-in-bid-to-win-eu-okay-for-fitbit-buy-idUKKCN24E2X5> accessed 23 July 2020.  
76 Cory Doctorow, ‘Your Objections to the Google-Fitbit Merger’ (EFF, 25 June 2020) 
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/your-objections-google-fitbit-merger> accessed 23 July 2020.  
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a long history of data protection,77 as well as a strong focus on trust and 
transparency. Therefore, it might seem excessive for other countries and probably 
for many Latin American countries. However, these measurements could be 
effective in Latin American countries with a high mistrust in the Government. 
Especially the utilization of open-source might be a way for establishing 
transparency and by that trust in the app, if there is a lack of trust in the government. 
The examples in the UK and Germany show that it is not sufficient to just highlight 
that such an app is useful to flatten the curve, there are many issues entangled on a 
more emotional and cultural level. Consequently, the cultural aspects of the public 
are one of the core issues that the implementation strategy needs to focus on, 
especially as from a technological point of view, creating this app is straight-forward. 
But how transparent or untrustworthy such an app is, is a decision significantly 
influenced – and shaped – by the government. 
 
It is therefore evident – and understandable – just how legislation on privacy 
protection comes as secondary concern in Latin America in contrast to those issues 
that are considered to be of collective interest. The cultural tendencies towards 
respecting authoritarianism and acquiescing to such higher powers manifests itself 
through pushing data protection and privacy concerns aside so as to allow other 
issues to dominate. Similarly, legislation implies compliance, something that is 
clearly problematic in Latin America, given the cultural and social norms, and the 
governance structures. It is, on balance, a markedly different system to that in 
Germany and the UK, and a ‘one-size fits all approach’ will be of very limited 
success.  
 
Two everyday expressions seem to explain a lot of what happens in the chasm 
between legislation and action. The first one is se obedece, pero no se cumple [it is 
obeyed, but not executed], a seeming tradition of the Spanish colonies during the 
colonial times to visibly show deference to the laws enacted by the monarchy, while 
at once avoiding their enforcement because of practical or idiosyncratic reasons.78 
This impossibility of enforcement has been pointed out as typical of developing 
countries.79 The second expression is hecha la ley, hecha la trampa, roughly 
translated by Miller80 as “when you pass a law, you create a loophole”, meaning that 
as soon as a law is enacted, a way around it is also developed. The two expressions 
amount to a superficial commitment to a law that does not translate into the 
necessary actions and, then, a clear omission of its requirements based on given 
loopholes. 
 
77 The German state of Hesse enacted the first Data Protection Act in 1970 (Datenschutzgesetz [Data 
Protection Act], October 7, 1970) with many other states following quickly. See: Kerstin 
Tscherpe in KOMMENTAR ZUM BDSG 1103 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, eds) 2010. 
 
78 Clara Ines Guerrero García, ‘Memorias palenqueras de la libertad’ in Claudia Mosquera Rosero-
Labbé and Luiz Claudio Barcelos (eds), Afro-reparaciones: Memorias de la Esclavitud y Justicia 
Reparativa para negros, afrocolombianos y raizales (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2007) 371.  
 
79 Lilliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez, ‘Constitutional adjudication in Colombia: Avant-garde or Case-law 
transplant? A literary review’ Estudios Socio-Jurídicos (2011) 13(1), 145, 173.  
 
80 Toby Miller, The Persistence of Violence, (Rutgers University Press) 2020, 3.  
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The use of tracing apps as a response to the pandemic is not isolated to individual 
states nor to selected regional groupings, but is seen across Europe, as well as Latin 
America, and yet the successes – and concerns – are distinct in these two regions. 
Where there are emerging areas of shared practice, such as the use of tracing apps, 
the concerns that are raised – whilst similar – are not always as dominant in the 
media coverage and analysis offered. In particular, while concerns in Germany and 
the UK are about data protection laws, and compliance, the concerns in Colombia 
and Ecuador rested on ‘selling’ the idea of an app to the public, and enticing the 
public to comply with incentives, rather than addressing privacy concerns initially. 
What is particularly interesting – and as the research in this paper has shown – is 
that despite the common goal of the tracing apps in Germany, the UK, and Colombia 
being to contribute to the management of the pandemic outbreaks, concerns have 
been raised about all of the tracing programmes. Moreover, the consistent and 
shared practice of developing an app is seen as a cornerstone of the approach in 
each of these examples, reflecting a greater trend towards data in public health more 
generally.81 
 
Even in light of the ‘Google got rich from your data’82 concerns – which resulted in a 
£3.81 billion fine in Europe for breaching anti-trust rules in 2018,83 there is still 
greater willingness to trust commercial exploiters of data than there is to trust the 
Government – this is the case irrespective of legal jurisdiction. Given this willingness, 
distrust of Governments in some countries is easy to see, particularly through the 
lens of tracing apps – and yet what is stark, is that society seems much more willing 
to share its personal data with those that will commercially exploit it instead of those 
who may use it for more nefarious, oversight, uses. The hangover of Orwellian 
warnings84 seems to remain strong in Europe, yet these concerns are not as 
prominent in Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile,85 nor Latin America more broadly. In 
Europe, the concerns and outcry about the invasiveness, the lack of privacy, and the 
resulting lack of trust was vociferous – and shared across jurisdictions. The concerns 
meanwhile in Latin America have been less vocal, yet still very much a factor in 
 
81 For more on health data see for example: Lizzie Presser, Maja Hruskova, Helen Rowbottom and 
Jess Kancir, ‘Care.data and access to UK health records: patient privacy and public trust’ Technology 
Science (2015) <https://techscience.org/a/2015081103/>; Elizabeth Parkin and Philip Loft, ‘Patient 
health records: access, sharing and confidentiality’ House of Commons Library (No 07103) (15 May 
2020) <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07103/SN07103.pdf>.  
82 Matt Burgess, ‘Google got rich from your data, DuckDuckGo is fighting back’ (Wired, 8 June 2020) 
<https://www.wired.co.uk/article/duckduckgo-android-choice-screen-search> accessed 22 July 2020. 
  
83 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices 
regarding Android mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google’s search engine’ 18 July 2018 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581> (accessed 22 July 2020) per 
Margrethe Vestager.  
 
84 BBC News, ‘Giant database plan ‘Orwellian’ (BBC News, 15 October 2008) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7671046.stm?butt=love> accessed 22 July 2020.  
85 International Law Firm Alliance, ‘The legal implications of Contact Tracing in Chile’ (Abdala & CIA 
Abogados, 29 May 2020) <https://diazreus.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/LATAM_contact-
tracing.pdf> accessed 22 July 2020.  
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discussions surrounding the pandemic response. Above all else, the sharing of data 
in Europe seems to concern people minimally when it comes to commercial parties 
like Google and Apple, yet the same sharing with governments is met with fear, and 
outcry – very different to the situation in Latin America, which serves to highlight the 
divergent approaches, but also the compliance tendency with government mandates, 
even where there are significant fundamental freedoms risks.  
 
Following the European model could have benefits for tracing apps in other regions – 
yet these are unlikely to be workable given the deficiencies in the data protection 
laws.  The norms of privacy as a public good are very much Westernised in their 
focus – they work where there is collective ‘buy in’ to the overall picture, and are less 
suited to situations and cultures, where there is an authoritarian overtone. Privacy 
can only be utilised in the public interest, if there is a critical mass supporting this 
perspective – until such a position is reached, concerns such as those seen in Latin 
America over tracing apps will continue to be raised, but will continue to be brushed 
aside. Privacy as a public good is a normalised ideal – it is not suited to each 
system.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The vastly different structures, constitutional arrangements and systems of 
managing personal data collections do not necessarily mean that the same values 
are prioritised in each nation. In Europe, the situation is more mixed, whereas in 
Latin America, the results have been stated to be much less impactful.86 In all 
countries and in both regions considered here, concerns have been raised about 
tracing apps, privacy, data protection, and accountability for such systems. Across 
Europe, the demand for respect for privacy and data protection has been a dominant 
force in the ways in which tracing apps have been refined. While similar concerns 
have arisen in Latin America, they have played out as more insignificant – privacy 
has been pushed aside in deference to public health. Cultural tendencies in Europe 
to protect individual information have not played out in the same ways in Latin 
America – mistrust has led to privacy as a public good coming to fruition in the 
Covid-19 response across Europe, whereas compliance has remained the dominant 
norm in Latin America.  
 
While there are some areas of convergence and shared issues – in particular about 
the lack of decentralized systems, about the anonymity of data, the compliance with 
data protection regimes, and lack of protections for personal data seen in some apps 
– especially as outlined by the Chaos Computer Club, the Open Rights Group, and 
the Karisma Foundation, the prominence of these concerns, and the influence of the 
organisations highlighting them has a very different impact depending on the country 
in which the concerns are raised. The key message that must be taken away from 
this analysis therefore rests at odds with the international community approach to 
privacy, data protection, and human rights, and suggests that while there must 
 
86 Gonzalo Salano, ‘Ecuador uses technology to fight COVID-19’ (AP, 16 April 2020) 
<https://apnews.com/516d5ddc49e3436c8681356a640c6a46> accessed 22 July 2020. 
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remain an emphasis on protecting rights and data, and aspiring to benchmarks must 
be the overarching goal, there is no one size fits all approach.  
 
The national traits and characteristics of states in Latin America are very different to 
those in Europe – privacy and data protection are recognised concerns, but they are 
not the dominant ones that set the agenda in Colombia and Ecuador, and other 
factors take the lead. One major obstacle is the lack of interoperability across apps 
from different countries, making the international tracing effort even more difficult. 
The cross-border use of tracing apps also poses problems as lockdown restrictions 
are lifted – notably due to the enforcement of data protection and privacy rights, but 
also because of the lack of interoperability across apps and national borders. The 
regulation of such apps is an apparent afterthought, especially given the speed with 
which such tracing systems have been rolled out.  
 
Undoubtedly, there is best practice – i.e. a regional consensus in responding to 
Covid-19 through the collection of data, and the use of a smartphone app to allow 
real time information to be gathered by decision makers – in establishing a tracing 
app to respond to Covid-19. Similarly, the work of civil society and NGOs in 
scrutinising the apps in various nations is vitally important and provides the core 
analysis of the scope of the data to be collated and retained. Without the work of 
these organisations, and their coming together internationally to share their research 
and expertise, it would be much more difficult to ascertain any kind of benchmarking 
for track and trace apps in different legal and regional areas. The holding to account 
of tracing systems and governments in utilising technology that is by its very nature 
invasive is vital in protecting rights. In times of crisis in particular, accountability is 
incredibly important to ensure that digital rights are not pushed aside in light of other 
concerns.  
 
Much of the reporting of the tracing apps, tracking programmes, and privacy 
concerns during the developmental processes and the initial stages of the pandemic 
have focussed on pitting digital rights and privacy against public health interests. The 
two are not mutually exclusive and yet the media suggest that they cannot coexist.87 
Such attitudes must change, and a balance must be struck. In attempting to balance 
digital rights and privacy, and public health, accountability and transparency are 
essential – the scrutiny of the track and trace systems in Germany, the UK, and 
Colombia indicates exactly this. The overwhelming conclusion is that privacy, digital 
rights, and human rights concerns abound – the Karisma Foundation, Chaos 
Computer Club, and Open Rights Group have all outlined significant – and shared – 
concerns in different countries over fundamentally different apps with a similar 
function.  
 
It is increasingly appropriate to use anonymised health data to identify clusters of 
disease, so the use of tracing is not new. However, the concerns surrounding 
transparent, trustworthy ways of doing so persist. A greater emphasis is falling on 
 
87 Emily Sharpe, ‘Using data to fight Covid-19 does not mean lowering the bar for privacy’ (Web 
Foundation, 15 June 2020) <https://webfoundation.org/2020/06/using-data-to-fight-covid-19-does-not-
mean-lowering-the-bar-for-privacy/> accessed 22 July 2020.  
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uses of data, but the privacy concerns – and the evolving norms in pursuing privacy 
as a public good remain a matter of national and regional disconnectedness. We 
should be using data to fight Covid-19, but we should not be setting privacy aside.  
 
